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Computational measures of linguistic diversity
help us understand the linguistic landscape us-
ing digital language data. The contribution of
this paper is to calibrate measures of linguis-
tic diversity using restrictions on international
travel resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Previous work has mapped the distribution of
languages using geo-referenced social media
and web data. The goal, however, has been to
describe these corpora themselves rather than
to make inferences about underlying popula-
tions. This paper shows that a difference-in-
differences method based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index can identify the bias in digi-
tal corpora that is introduced by non-local pop-
ulations. These methods tell us where signifi-
cant changes have taken place and whether this
leads to increased or decreased diversity. This
is an important step in aligning digital corpora
like social media with the real-world popula-
tions that have produced them.
1 Biases in digital language data
Data from social media and web-crawled sources
has been used to map the distribution of both
languages (Mocanu et al., 2013; Gonçalves and
Sánchez, 2014; Lamanna et al., 2018; Dunn, 2020)
and dialects (Eisenstein et al., 2014; Cook and Brin-
ton, 2017; Dunn, 2019b,a; Grieve et al., 2019). This
line of research is important because traditional
methods have relied on census data and missionary
reports (Eberhard et al., 2020; IMB, 2020), both of
which are often out-of-date and can be inconsistent
across countries. At the same time, we know that
digital data sets do not necessarily reflect the un-
derlying linguistic diversity in a country: the actual
population of South Africa, for example, is not ac-
curately represented by tweets from South Africa
(Dunn and Adams, 2019).
This becomes an important problem as soon as
we try to use computational linguistics to tell us
about people or language. For example, if an ap-
plication is using Twitter to track sentiment about
COVID-19, that tracking is meaningless without
good information about how well it represents the
population. Or, if an application is using Twitter
to study lexical choices, that study depends on a
relationship between lexical choices on Twitter and
lexical choices more generally. In other words, the
more we use digital corpora for scientific purposes,
the more we need to control for bias in that data.
There are four sources of diversity-related bias that
we need to take into account.
First, production bias occurs when one location
(like the US) produces so much digital data that
most corpora over-represent that location (Jurgens
et al., 2017). For example, by default a corpus of
English from the web or Twitter will mostly repre-
sent the US and the UK (Kulshrestha et al., 2012).
It has been shown that this type of bias can be cor-
rected using population-based sampling (Dunn and
Adams, 2020) to enforce the representation of all
relevant populations.
Second, sampling bias occurs when a subset of
the population produces a disproportionate amount
of the overall data. This type of bias has been
shown to be closely related to economic measures:
more wealthy populations produce more digital
language per capita (Dunn and Adams, 2019). By
default, a corpus will contain more samples repre-
senting wealthier members of the population. Thus,
Figure 1: Number of observations per country.
this is similar to production bias, but with a demo-
graphic rather than a geographic scope.
Third, non-local bias is the problem of over-
representing those people in a place who are not
from that place: tourists, aid workers, students,
short-term visitors, etc. For example, in countries
with low per-capita GDP (i.e., where local popu-
lations often lack internet access) digital language
data is likely to represent outsiders like aid workers.
On the other hand, in countries with large numbers
of international tourists (e.g., New Zealand), data
sets are likely to instead be contaminated with sam-
ples from these tourists.
Fourth, majority language bias occurs when a
multi-lingual population only uses some of its lan-
guages in digital contexts (Lackaff and Moner,
2016). Most often, majority languages like En-
glish and French are used online while minority
languages are used in face-to-face contexts. The
result is that even though an individual may be
represented in a corpus, the full range of their lin-
guistic behaviours is not represented. This is the
only type of bias not quantified in this paper. For
example, it is possible that changes in linguistic
diversity are caused by a shift in behaviour, rather
than a shift in population characteristics.
Of the three sources of bias that we examine
here, non-local bias is the most difficult to uncover
(Graham et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2016). We
can identify production bias when the amount of
data per country exceeds that country’s share of the
global population. In this sense, the ideal corpus
of English would equally represent each country
according to the number of English speakers in
that country. Within a country, we can measure
the amount of sampling bias by looking at how
economic measures like GDP and rates of internet
access correspond with the amount of data per per-
son. Thus, we could use median income by zip
code to ensure that the US is properly represented.
But non-local bias is more challenging because we
need to know which samples from a place like New
Zealand come from those speakers who are only
passing through for a short time.
Only with widespread restrictions on interna-
tional travel during the COVID-19 pandemic do
we have access to a collection of digital language
from which non-local populations are largely ab-
sent (Gössling et al., 2020; Hale et al., 2020). This
paper uses changes in linguistic diversity during
these travel restrictions, against a historical base-
line, to calibrate computational measures that sup-
port language and population mapping. This is a
part of the larger problem of estimating population
characteristics from digital language data.
We start by describing the data used for the ex-
periments in the paper (Section 2), drawn from
Twitter over a two-year period. We then explore
sources of bias in this data set by looking at pro-
duction bias and sampling bias (in Section 3) and
then developing a baseline of temporal variation in
the data (in Section 4). We introduce a measure of
geographic linguistic diversity (Section 5). Then
we use this measure to find which countries and
languages are most contaminated by non-local pop-
ulations (in Section 6). Finally, we examine the
results to find where the linguistic landscape has
changed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Region N. Pop Data
Africa, Southern 12.28m 1.0% 2.0%
Africa, Sub 43.87m 10.1% 7.0%
Africa, North 16.60m 3.4% 2.7%
America, Brazil 10.96m 2.8% 1.8%
America, Central 66.12m 2.9% 10.6%
America, North 24.64m 4.8% 4.0%
America, South 77.79m 2.9% 12.5%
Asia, East 15.88m 22.3% 2.6%
Asia, Central 15.08m 2.7% 2.4%
Asia, South 30.06m 23.3% 4.8%
Asia, Southeast 31.88m 8.4% 5.1%
Europe, East 51.48m 2.4% 8.3%
Europe, Russia 9.38m 2.0% 1.5%
Europe, West 155.74m 5.7% 25.0%
Middle East 36.58m 4.5% 5.9%
Oceania 24.92m 0.8% 4.0%
Total 623.33m 100% 100%
Table 1: Distribution of data by region.
2 Data sources
We draw on Twitter data sampled globally from 10k
cities over a 25-month period (July 2018 through
August 2020). This city-based collection reduces
production bias from the start (as opposed to col-
lecting data by user or search term) because it
forces non-central cities to be included. The cities
are selected to represent the global population and
all retweets are removed. This provides 623 mil-
lion tweets, distributed across regions as shown in
Table 1 with each region’s share of the data and of
the world’s population.
This table provides a clear illustration of pro-
duction bias. East Asia, for example, accounts for
22.3% of the world’s population but only 2.6% of
the data. We see the reverse in Western Europe,
which provides 25% of the data but only 5.7% of
the population. Population-based sampling is an
effective method for correcting this bias (Dunn and
Adams, 2020), if the goal is to produce a corpus rep-
resenting the actual distribution of speakers. Our
goal here is to find which countries contain data
from non-local populations. To do this, we need to
find out if the data has a stable geographic distribu-
tion that is driven by the underlying population.
The idNet language identification package is
used to provide language labels (Dunn, 2020). Any
tweet under 40 characters (after cleaning URLs and
hashtags) is removed because of reduced identifi-
cation accuracy below this threshold. The average
tweets per month per country is visualized in Fig-
ure 1. Because we are looking at change over time
by country, the data is binned into potentially small
categories (e.g., Nigeria in July 2019). Both the
table and the map show that countries in East Asia
are under-represented. Thus, we use significance
testing within countries when looking for change
over time.
3 Demographics and language use
The next question is the degree to which the produc-
tion of this data is driven by underlying populations
(potential production bias) and by demographic fac-
tors like GDP (potential selection bias). We start,
in Figure 3, by looking at the relationship between
each country’s population and share of the corpus.
This expands on the region aggregations in Table 1
by dividing regions into countries. Each country
is an observation that is represented by its average
monthly data production and several demographic
factors. Overall, there is a very significant correla-
tion (Pearson) between population and the amount
of data from each country (0.46). Thus, the num-
ber of people in a country is an important factor
explaining how much data that country produces.
While this is significant, however, it also means
that there are many other factors that influence the
geographic distribution of the data.
To better understand the factors influencing the
geographic distribution of the data, we work with
three variables: population, the number of people
in each country; internet population, the number of
internet users in each country; and GDP, a measure
of each country’s economic output (United Nations,
2011, 2017b,a). Figure 3 shows three regression
plots in which these variables (on the y axis) are
compared with the average monthly data produc-
tion per country (given in number of tweets per
month on the x axis).
In each case, there is a close relationship be-
tween data production and demographics, with sev-
eral extreme outliers. For population, the outliers
are China and India. Both are highly populated
countries with significantly lower than expected
data production (especially China). Both countries
have relatively low rates of internet access: 38%
for China and 11% for India; this lowers the total
population in each country. Thus, although the pop-
ulations are quite large, most of the population is
not able to produce digital language data. For the
influence of GDP, the outliers are the US and China.
Figure 2: Geographic distribution of data by region by month.
Figure 3: Relationship between data and demographic
factors: Population, Internet Access, and GDP (With
Outliers Removed).
For the US, in particular, the GDP is quite high:
there seems to be a ceiling after which increased
GDP is unlikely to influence digital behaviours.
Further, that GDP is not evenly distributed across
the entire population. For the influence of internet
access, the outliers are again China and the US.
With a few notable exceptions there is a relatively
close relationship between data production and the
demographic factors of each country.
With these three outliers removed (the US,
China, India), there are very significant correla-
tions between these three variables and the geo-
graphic distribution of the data: 0.46 (population),
0.61 (population with internet access), and 0.59
(GDP). This leaves some unexplained production
factors. The most obvious missing factor here is
social media platforms specific to given countries
(e.g., Sina Weibo). These alternative platforms will
siphon away enough users to distort the represen-
tation of a population given access only to other
platforms. Further, Twitter is banned in China: be-
cause only some companies are allowed to use it
through specific VPNs, the text is not represen-
tative of language use in China. Casual users of
Twitter will use a VPN through another country
which would distort this method of data collection.
Regardless, this section has shown that we can
explain a significant portion of the geographic dis-
tribution of the data. This is important because we
want to describe populations by observing digital
corpora. If there is no relationship between the
two in terms of distribution, it is difficult to make
such inferences. What we have seen, however, is
that there is a very significant relationship. What
Figure 4: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the distribution of languages by country.
is the required threshold for establishing a relation-
ship like this? We should think about this as a
metric for evaluating digital corpora: data with a
stronger relationship to demographic variables are
more representative. The next question is whether
this relationship remains stable over time: can we
depend on these demographic factors across the
entire period?
4 Controlling for temporal variation
The next question is whether these production fac-
tors are stable over time. Here we build a baseline
for temporal variation: to what degree is the data
subject to unrelated fluctuations that will reduce
our ability to assign a cause-and-effect relationship
to linguistic diversity during travel restrictions?
Although the same collection and processing
methods are maintained over the two-year period,
there is variation in the total number of observa-
tions (tweets) per month. There are many reasons
why this might be the case. What matters to us,
though, is the relative share of each country. In
other words, the population does not change from
month to month in the same way that the number
of tweets changes. Regardless of the total amount
of data collected per month, is the geographic dis-
tribution consistent? Figure 2 shows stability over
time by representing the relative proportion of ob-
servations per region by month. Western Europe
is removed for the sake of clarity, as it represents
a significantly higher share (roughly 25%). The
distribution of samples is consistent over time. The
main exception is that, for a two-month period in
2018, there is much more data from Oceania.
We use a t-test to find out if the share of each re-
gion is stable over time. If the distribution changes
significantly, then it may be hard to determine the
cause of any individual change. None of the re-
gions show a significant fluctuation; this is helpful
because it shows that there is not random noise
in the data that could interfere with measures of
linguistic diversity. The difference-in-differences
methods we use in Section 8 would control for such
noise, but this gives us further confidence. We use
a t-test, rather than a time-specific test like Dickey-
Fuller, because we are interested in consistency
rather than in non-stationarity. These results show
that, in the aggregate, the distribution of samples
remains constant. But how much variation within
individual countries does this region-based mea-
sure disguise? To answer this, we look at the same
t-test approach by country: do individual countries
vary widely in their relative production? No coun-
tries show a significant change.
These findings show that we can largely focus
on diversity, the distribution of languages within a
country by month, rather than on the production of
data over month as in Section 3. There is natural
variation in the data, of course, and this is taken
into account in our later approaches. For example,
if we compute the correlation between population
and language production (as in Section 3) for each
month in isolation, there is no significant difference
over time. This stability is important for creating a
baseline against which to understand demographic
changes during travel restrictions. Because the
relationship between demographics and the data
set remains stable, we can focus specifically on
changes in linguistic diversity.
Figure 5: Countries with significant change in linguistic diversity during travel restrictions.
5 Measuring linguistic diversity
Linguistic diversity is an important part of accurate
language and population mapping. The goal is to
have a single measure that can tell us how much
language contact is taking place and which commu-
nities are multi-lingual. To do this we must gener-
alize across specific languages: linguistic diversity
in the US might involve English and Spanish, but
it might involve Portuguese and Spanish in Brazil.
We measure linguistic diversity as a probability
distribution over languages for each country. Draw-
ing on previous work on short-sample language
identification, this paper includes 464 languages
across 157 countries. For each country, then, we
have a relatively accurate identification of which
languages are used on Twitter. Given this proba-
bility distribution for each country, we compare
countries using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) as shown in Figure 4. The HHI was devel-
oped in economics to measure market concentra-
tion: the more of a given industry is dominated by
a small number of companies, the higher the HHI
(Hirschman, 1945). The measure is derived using
the sum of the square of shares, in this case the
share of each language in each country. The higher
the HHI (the darker red) for a country, the more
one language dominates the linguistic landscape.
Thus, the HHI is higher when the distribution is
centered around just a few languages. For example,
in Table 2 we focus on three countries that show
a range of linguistic diversity: Israel, India, and
the US. Israel has the lowest HHI (0.207). Look-
ing at the share of the top five languages, we see
roughly equal usage of three languages (in the 20s)
ISR IND USA
HHI 0.207 0.356 0.852
L1 27.3% 50.8% 92.3%
L2 25.9% 30.8% 2.6%
L3 23.5% 3.4% 0.6%
L4 7.5% 2.5% 0.6%
L5 5.3% 1.4% 0.4%
Table 2: Sample language distributions by country.
followed by two significant minority languages.
This lower HHI reflects the fact that a number of
languages are being used together: no language
has a monopoly. On the other extreme, the US has
one of the highest values for HHI (0.852). There is
one very dominant language (92%), one significant
minority language (2.6%), and a number of very
insignificant languages. English has a metaphoric
monopoly on the linguistic landscape of the US.
Figure 4 shows linguistic diversity across the
world: lighter countries (like Israel) have a mix
of languages while darker countries (like the US)
are mostly monolingual. There are many linguistic
landscapes around the world, ranging from multi-
lingual to monolingual. This Figure 4 is a baseline
representation, averaged across the entire time pe-
riod (July 2018 to August 2020). It is possible
that this averaged representation disguises tempo-
ral fluctuations. We have already seen that there are
only a few changes in the share of data per country
per month, and no significant change in the relation-
ship between the data set and demographic factors
like GDP. The question here is whether there is arbi-
trary variation in the linguistic diversity per country
Figure 6: Increasing vs. decreasing HHI during travel restrictions.
per month. In other words, if Israel becomes signif-
icantly more diverse every three months, it will be
difficult to find out what is causing those changes.
We use a a t-test for the mean of each country to
determine if each country’s diversity is actually a
single group. There are no significant fluctuations
across the period as a whole.
6 Finding non-local populations
To what degree do countries change during travel
restrictions resulting from COVID-19? We have
a measure of diversity (the HHI) and data col-
lected by month. The basic approach is to create
two groups of samples: first, months during the
pandemic (March through August, 2020); second,
months not during the pandemic (March through
August, 2019). These two groups are aligned by
month so that seasonal fluctuations are taken into
account (e.g., tourism high season in February for
New Zealand and in July for Italy). Given these
two groups of samples, we use a t-test for two
independent samples to determine whether these
groups are, in fact, different. If we reject the null
hypothesis, it means that linguistic diversity during
travel restrictions is significantly different than the
seasonally-adjusted baseline.
The results show that 70 countries have a
changed linguistic landscape during the pandemic.
This is visualized in Figure 5, with p-values classed
into highly significant (under 0.001), very signifi-
cant (under 0.01), and significant (under 0.05). We
see, for example, that the US and Canada undergo
significant change, but not Mexico and South Amer-
ica. There are clear geographic patterns in linguis-
tic change: North but not Central or South America;
East Africa but not West Africa; South/east Asia
but not East Asia; Europe but not Russia. We will
examine in more detail how and why the linguistic
landscape changes in Section 7.
These significant changes during international
travel restrictions show that our measure (the HHI)
and our data (tweets) offer a meaningful represen-
tation of underlying populations. If the data did
not represent populations, we would not see the
relationships examined in Section 3. There are no
random fluctuations in the distribution of the data
across countries or in the distribution of languages
within countries. At the same time, given a massive
social change (i.e., the COVID-19 pandemic), the
measure clearly identifies changes in the linguis-
tic landscape. Thus, the measure is both precise
(not disguised by noise) and accurate (observing
change where we expect it). The key point is that
the change in diversity during the COVID-19 pe-
riod is identifiable against the background noise.
A country’s linguistic landscape could change by
becoming more diverse (i.e., with more languages)
or by becoming less diverse (i.e., with fewer lan-
guages). Which is causing the significant changes
that we are observing? Figure 6 distinguishes be-
tween countries with an increasing HHI (becoming
more monolingual) and a decreasing HHI (becom-
ing more multilingual). We can think about two
contexts in which this change can take place: a
country like India might look more multilingual
because non-local tourists who speak English are
no longer creating noise in the data; or, a country
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Sao Tome 12.57% 7.14%
Yemen 14.44% 9.20%
Table 3: Major reductions in English.
because its own English-speaking citizens abroad
are returning home. The flow of international trav-
ellers changes the balance of locals and non-locals
in both directions (leaving and coming home).
7 Identifying out-of-place populations
Our task now is to use these changes during travel
restrictions to identify which populations are out-
of-place in ordinary times. In other words, if India
has decreasing English use during the pandemic pe-
riod, then we know that English is over-represented
in the country as a result of non-local populations.
We find these languages by repeating the compari-
son of pandemic vs. normal periods per country per
month, but now we look at the share of individual
languages rather than the HHI (in countries with
a significant change). We are only interested in
languages which account for at least 1% of a coun-
try’s usage. Less commonly used languages may
be changing significantly but have less influence
on a country’s overall linguistic landscape.
We start by looking at countries where the use of
English falls dramatically during the pandemic pe-
riod, in Table 3. These dramatic reductions suggest
that much of the population represented on Twitter
is non-local: there is a change from 63% to 42% in
Eritrea and from 53% to 44% English use in Mada-
gascar. If the local population was well-represented
on Twitter, we would not see this dramatic reduc-
tion in an international language. Thus, here we see
an example of how digital data is biased towards
non-local populations in countries where the local
population has reduced internet access.
The influence of non-local populations returning
home is shown for Russian and Arabic in Table 4.
We see a major reduction in the use of Russian in
Country Language Normal COVID
Belarus Russian 69.05% 66.13%
Ukraine Russian 54.60% 50.06%
Lithuania Russian 20.09% 15.72%
Latvia Russian 10.43% 8.26%
Algeria Arabic 51.56% 46.77%
Morocco Arabic 33.75% 28.53%
Israel Arabic 27.75% 26.08%
Tunisia Arabic 24.24% 19.65%
Bhutan Arabic 6.25% 2.55%
Moldova Arabic 2.71% 0.79%
Table 4: Major reductions in Russian and Arabic.
Country Language Normal COVID
SAU Arabic 70.10% 81.87%
SAU English 12.18% 7.35%
SAU Turkish 4.34% 2.12%
SAU Greek 2.55% 1.65%
BEL French 28.64% 34.72%
BEL English 31.01% 26.83%
BEL Dutch 27.08% 25.12%
BEL German 2.26% 1.93%
BEL Portuguese 1.51% 1.68%
Table 5: Changing landscape in Saudi Arabia and Bel-
gium.
countries like Ukraine that have had a strong Rus-
sian influence (from 54% to 50%). In both Ukraine
and Belarus, there are other social and political fac-
tors that could influence the shift, since much of
the population is bilingual (e.g., bilingual speakers
in Ukraine putting aside the use of Russian for po-
litical purposes). But we also see similar changes
in the use of Arabic. In Algeria it falls from 51%
to 46% and in Morocco from 33% to 28%. These
countries do not have the same political factors
as Ukraine and Belarus, thus providing a clearer
example of the exodus of non-local populations.
We get a different view by looking at the change
of languages within a country, as with Belgium and
Saudi Arabia in Table 5. In Saudi Arabia we see a
rise in Arabic at the expense of English, Turkish,
and Greek. This reflects the exodus of non-local
tourists and workers; but it also likely reflects the
return of Saudi Arabians from countries like Alge-
ria and Morocco that is suggested by Table 4. In
Belgium, we see a rise in French at the expense of
English, Dutch, German, and Portuguese. This is a
reflection of a reduction in non-local tourists.
However, we see the opposite effect of tourists
Country Language Normal COVID
NZL English 86.26% 84.13%
NZL Spanish 2.13% 3.37%
NZL Portuguese 2.30% 2.82%
NZL Indonesian 0.89% 1.27%
AUS English 89.51% 87.45%
AUS Portuguese 1.83% 2.52%
AUS Spanish 1.52% 2.08%
AUS Japanese 0.99% 1.32%
Table 6: Changing landscape in Oceania.
leaving when we look at New Zealand and Aus-
tralia, two countries which have had closed borders
(Table 6). Here there is a reduction in English us-
age within English-majority countries that takes
place when international tourists stop arriving. The
situation here is that there are so many English-
speaking tourists (i.e., from the US and UK) that
local immigrant languages like Spanish and Por-
tuguese (part of the long-term local population) are
drowned out by non-local tourists using English.
Another possible explanation is that immigrant pop-
ulations are increasingly using Twitter to commu-
nicate with non-local populations (e.g., with family
and friends in their previous country).
8 Sources of Change
This paper has shown that there is a significant
change in the linguistic diversity of many countries
during the travel restrictions caused by COVID-19.
But to what degree are these changes related to
the travel restrictions themselves? For example,
we could imagine a population that is changing
over time which we just happen to observe in mid-
change. It could be the case that a country has been
becoming less diverse over the past decade because
of fewer incoming immigrants; the approach taken
so far in this paper would misinterpret such macro-
trends to be a direct result of COVID-19.
We use a difference-in-differences method (Card
and Krueger, 1994) to correct for this. The basic
idea behind a difference-in-differences approach
is to conduct a natural experiment with a control
group (here, data from 2018) and an effect group
(here, data from 2020) differentiated by time. We
have three months (July, August, September) that
are shared across 2018, 2019, and 2020. So, using
the same methods described above, we find out
which countries have a significant change between
2019 and 2020. This is the period that takes place
during travel restrictions. If travel restrictions in-
fluence linguistic diversity, we would expect such
influence to take place during this period. We then
find out if the countries which show a significant
change in 2020 also show a significant change from
2018 to 2019. This provides a baseline: removing
any country whose linguistic diversity was already
in the process of changing.
Over this three-month period (July through
September), 58 countries show a change in linguis-
tic diversity during the pandemic. This is a smaller
number than the main results reported above for
two reasons: (i) the time span is shorter, giving
less robust results and (ii) this particular time span
came after some travel had resumed. Of these 58
countries that show a significant change in diversity,
most (38) show no difference at all in the baseline
period before the pandemic. Another eight show
a much greater difference during the COVID-19
period (e.g., p-values of 0.03 vs 0.004 for baseline
and COVID-19, respectively). This means that the
pandemic has either created or has significantly
contributed to 79.3% of the cases of changing lin-
guistic diversity. The remaining 20.7% of changes,
then, must have been created by macro-trends like
immigration or changes in bilingual behaviour. The
main conclusion from this difference-in-differences
examination, however, is that most of these changes
can be specifically connected to COVID-19.
9 Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to validate measures of
linguistic diversity using changes in underlying
populations during the COVID-19 pandemic. We
have shown that there is a significant relationship
between our data and the underlying population.
Thus, what we are observing (tweets) can tell us
about the people we want to study. At the same
time, both the distribution of the data across coun-
tries and the distribution of languages within coun-
tries are stable. Thus, the data does not have ran-
dom fluctuations that will get in the way. Using the
HHI as a measure of diversity, there is a significant
change in the linguistic landscape of 70 countries
against a seasonally-adjusted baseline. This reflects
non-local populations (e.g., the impact of tourists
leaving a country or short-term visitors returning to
their own countries). These results validate a mea-
sure of linguistic diversity that is based on digital
language data and shows that we can correct for
the bias introduced by non-local populations.
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